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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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FRANCE-USSR: Both countries have expressed satisfaction with the outcome of talks held during President Pompidou's week-long visit in the Soviet Union.

The official communiqué's favorable attitude toward convening a "properly prepared" all-European conference aimed at East-West detente is more forthcoming toward this project than previous French positions. The French had been skeptical about holding a Conference on European Security (CES) and had been adamant in reserving their support for a CES until the Soviets made positive concessions on Berlin. In July, there were several indications that the attitude of Paris toward a CES was changing, but Pompidou's endorsement in the communiqué is certainly the first public--and most positive--affirmation of French approval of CES.

In an effort to repair stagnant bilateral ties, the two countries signed a protocol to regularize political consultations. It calls for regular semi-annual consultations and emergency talks if a threat to peace should arise. Though it is unlikely that Moscow attaches much practical significance to the protocol, it does serve as a symbolic reaffirmation of the "special" character of Franco-Soviet relations, as does Soviet acceptance of Pompidou's invitation to their leaders to visit France in 1971. Thus, Moscow probably judges that it has corrected any deterioration in Franco-Soviet relations as a result of France's fears that West Germany is supplanting it as Moscow's principal negotiating partner in the West. The French regard such political consultations as symbolic. Nonetheless, they will be portrayed as an assurance of Paris' closer links with Moscow and will demonstrate Pompidou's ability to enhance the ties established in 1966 by his predecessor.

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[ JORDAN: Yesterday's agreement between the government and the fedayeen does not represent a clear victory for either side.

Many of the government's chief aims have been realized, but were somewhat weakened by vaguely worded exceptions whose full extent still remains to be seen. One article, for example, seems to subordinate freedom of fedayeen action to Jordanian law--long an aim of the government--but promptly waters down the point by speaking of unspecified exceptions. The fedayeen are barred from carrying weapons in towns, but again, provision is made for "certain exceptional cases." Commandos are apparently answerable to the civil courts for ordinary crimes, although the fedayeen command seems to be responsible for general discipline.

The government has made some clear gains. The provision specifying the location of fedayeen bases has not been made public, but the government has been promised that they will not be near cities and villages--a major point of contention. The Palestine Liberation Organization's central committee has also been made fully responsible for enforcing its obligations on all fedayeen groups.

The fedayeen, however, were given concessions that the government earlier seemed determined not to grant. The Amman headquarters of the central committee, for example, will be protected by fedayeen guards and is apparently free to conduct a full range of activities, including military. The government has agreed that no one is to be detained or suspended because of the recent incidents

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[ The fedayeen have also been promised that the government will not establish or operate organizations "contrary to the interests of the Palestine revolution," but there is no indication that the fedayeen have any clear-cut veto power over government departments or personnel. ]

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The crucial issue of implementation has been left to a three-man joint committee, with one member each from the government and fedayeen and either Tunisian Premier Bahi Ladgham or his representative. The agreement is so ambiguous that the line taken by the joint committee will probably be decisive in determining which side comes out on top. A continuing pan-Arab presence in Jordan is also guaranteed by the creation of a military subcommittee, including the observers from various Arab countries already in Jordan, which is presumably intended to prevent a new outbreak of fighting.

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
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AUSTRALIA - NEW ZEALAND: Australia and New Zealand are concerned over the still imprecise reports that Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is considering permitting Soviet warships to be serviced in Singapore. Already nervous about Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean, they are even more uneasy over the prospect of Singapore's facilitating Soviet naval operations in the area. Pending clarification of Lee's recent talks in Moscow, however, neither government plans to take any action. Although Lee believes the USSR should be involved in Southeast Asia as a counterbalance to other powers, particularly China, it seems unlikely that he would insist on arrangements for the servicing of Soviet warships in the face of strong Commonwealth resistance.

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